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RECENT DECISIONS

Evidence-Admissibility in Evidence to Impeach Witness of a Conviction' Based on Plea of Nolo Contendere-A and B, defendants in the
action, were patentees of "hydraulic gasoline and oil distribution systems." They were in competition with one another and C, the plaintiff
in the suit, asked bids from both defendant companies. C had been
awarded a contract to build a Naval air station at Pensacola, Florida,
and desired the "system" installed on that project. It was agreed between A and B that B should not quote C a price less than $6,800. B
thereafter not only bid $7,453 for the work, but imposed as terms exactly
those suggested by A. A subsequently was awarded the contract for
$6,573 and C paid all but the last ten percent of the agreed price. The
action was to recover three times the difference between the amount
so paid and the reasonable cost of installing the system. Previously, the
grand jury for the Southern District of New York returned an indictment against the defendants and others charging them with a conspiracy to violate the Anti-Trust Acts. Both A tnd B pleaded nolo
contendere to this indictment and were fined $10,000 and $6,250 respectively. While B was on the stand in the present civil suit, the plaintiffs offered the record of this criminal prosecution to impeach his
credibility; but the judge excluded it. Judgment was rendered for the
defendants and the plaintiff appealed, alleging among other things, the
exclusion of the evidence above referred to. Held: The record of conviction of the witness on a plea of nolo contendere was admissible to
impeach the witness. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, 162 F. (2d) 779 (C.C.A.

2nd, 1947).
The opinion of the court in the above case is the opinion prevailing
in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. The question has
not arisen often, but where it has the general holding has been that the
conviction of a witness upon a plea of nolo contendere corresponds'to
a conviction on a plea of guilty and is admissible in evidence as affecting his credibility. These decisions were rendered in jurisdictions where
there are statutes which decree witnesses who have been convicted of
crimes competent to testify, but which state that the conviction may be
shown to affect their credibility. Statutes of this type have been generally enacted, but there are some states in which a person convicted of perjury is disqualified as a witness.1 In such states, however, persons convicted of other crimes are competent to testify but such convictions,
may be shown to affect their credibility. Statutes in a few states make
persons convicted of crimes competent as witnesses, but say nothing
as to whether a conviction or sentence of a witness on a criminal charge
may be shown for impeachment purposes. 2 It could be concluded that
'Alabama, Maryland, Mississippi, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Florida
have statutes of this type.
2 Texas, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, North Dakota and Kentucky.
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no criminal conviction is admissible to affect credibility in these few
jurisdictions, and if so this would include convictions after pleas of nolo
contendere.
In a liquor law prosecution wherein the statute in question provided that "no person is incompetent to testify in any court or legal
proceeding in consequence of having been convicted of a criminal
offense; but such conviction may be shown to affect his credibility," it
was held that previous convictions of the defendant pursuant to pleas
of nolo contendere on charges of selling intoxicating liquor and keeping and maintaining a drinking house and tippling shop, were admissible to affect his credibility as a witness. It seems that this ruling might
well have rested upon the language of the statute. However, in support
of its ruling the court stated that the plea of nolo contendere was an
"implied confession of the offense charged," and that the judgment of
conviction followed that plea as well as the plea of guilty. 3 So also
in a homicide case where the court had under consideration a similar
statute, it was held proper upon the trial during the cross examination
of the defendant, for the purpose of affecting his credibility as a witness, to require him to answer whether or not he had pleaded non vult
contendere to a charge of petit larceny, the court being of the opinion
that such a plea amounts to a conviction. 4
There is plausibility in the argument of jurisdictions like Massacusetts and New Hampshire that the plea of nolo contendere is in fact a
confession on which a defendant may be sentenced in the particular
prosecution, but as the plea is limited to the particular case, such conviction cannot be used in another proceeding to discredit the witness. 5
In fact, there may be some question whether the conviction upon such
plea is a conviction within the meaning of a statute dealing with impeachment. Thus the Massachusetts Court has set down the proposition
that under the Massachusetts statute only a sentence after a plea of
guilty or a trial constitutes a conviction. 6
Judge L. Hand in the principal case was not obliged to decide
which view of this subject is more rational because his action was governed by Federal Rules of Procedure, rule 43 (a), 28 U.S.C.A., fol-

3 State v. Herlihy, 102 Me. 310, 66A. 643 (1906).

4 State v. Henson, 66 N.J.L. 601, 50 A. 468 (1901);

Accord: Hill v. Maxwell, 77 N.J.L. 766, 73 A. 501 (1909);
Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.J.Eq. 507, 80 A. 119 (1911);
State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 107 A. 85 (1919) ;
State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 P. 845 (1927); Haley v. Brady, 17 Wash.
(2d) 775, 137 P. (2d) 505 (1943) ; State v. Radoff, 140 Wash. 202, 248 P. 405
(1926); 146 A.L.R. 859 (1926).
5 Olszewsld v. Goldberg, 223 Mass. 27, 111 N.E. 404 (1916); Com. v. Hilton,
8 Met. (Mass.) 232 (1844); Krowka v. Colt Patent Firm Arm Mfg. Co.,
125 Conn. 705, 8 A. (2d) 5 (1939); White v. Creamer, 179 Mass. 576, 61
6 N.E. 266 (1900); Collins v. Benson, 81 N.H. 10, 120 A. 724 (1923).
Karasek v. Bockus, 293 Mass. 371, 199 N.E. 726 (1936).
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lowing section 723 C which states that where there is a doubt as to the
competency of evidence such evidence must be admitted. However,
even in the absence of a rule of procedure or a statute governing the
situation, the holding in the case under consideration that a conviction
following a plea of nolo contendere should be admissible to affect the
credibility of a wifness, ought to prevail. As stated by judge Hand in
his opinion the question to be decided in a matter of this kind is what
consequences will follow if the defendant files such a plea. It is the
law that such a plea of nolo contendere cannot be used as evidence
against the defendant of an admission in a civil suit brought against
him and based on the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
was brought. This is the only limitation which the law assures the accused he will be entitled to invoke. If the intent of the lawmakers was,
as the minority view would have us believe, that a conviction following
a plea of nolo contendere cannot be used to affect the credibility of a
witness, the lawmakers could have easily incorporated this view into
the law by express words. Since they failed to do so, it is fair to infer
that such was not their intent.
The plea of nolo contendere is an implied confession 7 and it is,
for all practical purposes, a plea of guilty s Undoubtedly in such a plea
the defendant admits his guilt and should be stopped from denying it
in a subsequent action except where the law expressly gives him this
privilege. Furthermore where a conviction is used to attack the credibility of a witness the court is not interested in whether the defendant
was guilty or innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but
rather, is only interested in the fact of a conviction. The rule of evidence governing the admissibility of a conviction to attack the credibility of a witness merely requires a conviction of a crime by a court
of justice. Since a conviction follows, as a matter of course, a plea of
nolo contendere, and such a conviction is as binding as one by a judge
or jury, it fulfills the requirements of this rule of evidence. The defendant was given every opportunity to prove his innocence, but chose
not to do this. Therefore, he has no cause to complain because a conviction based upon his failure to contest the case is later used to attack
his credibility as a witness.
The plea under discussion is an ancient plea in criminal cases. In
England it was recognized many years ago as an implied confession
where, in case not capital, a defendant does not directly own himself to
be guilty, but tacitly admits it by throwing himself on the king's mercy
and desiring to submit to a small fine, which plea the court may either
State v. Suick, 195 Wis. 175, 217 N.W. 743 (1928); Brozosky v. State, 197
Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311 (1929).
8 Pharr v. U.S., 48 F. (2d) 776 at 770 (C.C.A. 6th, 1931); Hudson v. U.S.
9 F. (2d) 825 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1925); Schad v. McNich, 103 W.Va. 44, 136
S.E. 865 (1927); In Re Smith, 365 Ill. 11, 5 N.E. (2d) 227 (1936).
7
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accept or decline, but which in most cases was readily accepted. If the
request is granted, an entry is made to this effect: That the defendant
"non vult contendere cum domina regina, et posvit se in gratiam curiae",
without compelling him to a more direct confession. It seems, therefore, that the whole purpose of such a plea was to enable the guilty
defendant to save the Crown the expense and time of a trial and trust
to the mercy of the king who ordinarily would, under circumstances
like this, impose a less severe punishment.9 It was without question, in
a majority of cases, an admission of guilt by a guilty person who, by
this plea, sought clemency from the Crown. In the United States today
it is used for a similar purpose because the court after a plea of nolo
contendere usually imposes a punishment less than would be imposed
after a plea of guilty. 10 Persons who use this plea know that the punishment will be less severe and, if they are guilty, they have everything
to gain and nothing to lose by using it. There are cases where the accused may, because of death or insanity, find himself without witnesses
to establish his innocence and may by entering the plea of nolo contendere avoid a fruitless contest. 1 However, such cases are probably
in the small minority.
Therefore if the minority view is accepted, persons who admit
their guilt will be protected from something that the law, under which
they seek immunity, never intended to shield them against. The few
innocent persons who enter the plea of nolo contendere because they
are unable to establish their innocence will undoubtedly suffer if the
majority view prevails, but such a consequence cannot be avoided in
the administration of justice. It is only in rare instances that a person
who is innocent will actually admit guilt and accept the conviction that
follows. It may be assumed that the great majority of persons entering
the plea of nolo contendere are guilty of the offense with which they
are charged. If they are guilty, there seems to be no good reason why
a conviction which follows such a plea as a matter of course, should not
be used to affect their credibility as witnesses at a later trial.
LEONARD CZAPLEWSKI

9 1 Chitty's Criminal Law 431.

10

People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859 (1934).

11Doughty v. DeAmoreel, 22 R.I. 158, 46 A. 838 (1900).

